Xrthnty

Part of a series on
Politics
Primary topics Index of politics articles Politics by country Politics by subdivision Political economy Political history Political history of the world Political philosophy
Political systems Anarchy City-state Democracy Dictatorship Directory Federacy Feudalism Meritocracy Monarchy Parliamentary Presidential Republic Semi-parliamentary Semi-presidential Theocracy
Academic disciplines Political science (political scientists) International relations (theory) Comparative politics
Public administration Bureaucracy (street-level) Adhocracy
Policy Public policy (doctrine) Domestic and foreign policy Civil society Public interest
Organs of government Separation of powers Legislature Executive Judiciary Election commission
Related topics Sovereignty Theories of political behavior Political psychology Biology and political orientation Political organisations Foreign electoral intervention
Subseries Electoral systems Elections (voting) Federalism Form of government Ideology Political campaigning Political parties
Politics Portal
v t e

Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense.^[1] A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Social choice theory dates from Condorcet's formulation of the voting paradox. Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) and Arrow's impossibility theorem in it are generally acknowledged as the basis of the modern social choice theory.^[1] In addition to Arrow's theorem and the voting paradox, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, the Condorcet jury theorem, the median voter theorem, and May's theorem are among the more well known results from social choice theory.

Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and voting theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society. Using elements of formal logic for generality, analysis proceeds from a set of seemingly reasonable axioms of social choice to form a social welfare function (or constitution).^[2] Results uncovered the logical incompatibility of various axioms, as in Arrow's theorem, revealing an aggregation problem and suggesting reformulation or theoretical triage in dropping some axiom(s).^[1]

Later work also considers approaches to compensations and fairness, liberty and rights, axiomatic domain restrictions on preferences of agents, variable populations, strategy-proofing of social-choice mechanisms, natural resources,^[1][3]capabilities and functionings,^[4] and welfare,^[5]justice,^[6] and poverty.^[7]

Social choice and public choice theory may overlap but are disjoint if narrowly construed. The Journal of Economic Literature classification codes place Social Choice under Microeconomics at JEL D71 (with Clubs, Committees, and Associations) whereas most Public Choice subcategories are in JEL D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).

Interpersonal utility comparison

Social choice theory depends upon the ability to aggregate, or sum up, individual preferences into a combined social welfare function. Individual preference can be modeled in terms of an economic utility function. The ability to sum utility functions of different individuals depends on the utility functions being comparable to each other; informally, individuals' preferences must be measured with the same yardstick. Then the ability to create a social welfare function depends crucially on the ability to compare utility functions. This is called interpersonal utility comparison.

Following Jeremy Bentham, utilitarians have argued that preferences and utility functions of individuals are interpersonally comparable and may therefore be added together to arrive at a measure of aggregate utility. Utilitarian ethics call for maximizing this aggregate.

Lionel Robbins questioned whether mental states, and the utilities they reflect, can be measured and, a fortiori, interpersonal comparisons of utility as well as the social choice theory on which it is based. Consider for instance the law of diminishing marginal utility, according to which utility of an added quantity of a good decreases with the amount of the good that is already in possession of the individual. It has been used to defend transfers of wealth from the "rich" to the "poor" on the premise that the former do not derive as much utility as the latter from an extra unit of income. Robbins (1935, pp. 138–40) argues that this notion is beyond positive science; that is, one cannot measure changes in the utility of someone else, nor is it required by positive theory.

Apologists of the interpersonal comparison of utility have argued that Robbins claimed too much. John Harsanyi agrees that full comparability of mental states such as utility is never possible but believes, however, that human beings are able to make some interpersonal comparisons of utility because they share some common backgrounds, cultural experiences, etc. In the example from Amartya Sen (1970, p. 99), it should be possible to say that Emperor Nero's gain from burning Rome was outweighed by the loss incurred by the rest of the Romans. Harsanyi and Sen thus argue that at least partial comparability of utility is possible, and social choice theory proceeds under that assumption.

Sen proposes, however, that comparability of interpersonal utility need not be partial. Under Sen's theory of informational broadening, even complete interpersonal comparison of utility would lead to socially suboptimal choices because mental states are malleable. A starving peasant may have a particularly sunny disposition and thereby derive high utility from a small income. This fact should not nullify, however, his claim to compensation or equality in the realm of social choice.

Social decisions should accordingly be based on immalleable factors. Sen proposes interpersonal utility comparisons based on a wide range of data. His theory is concerned with access to advantage, viewed as an individual's access to goods that satisfy basic needs (e.g., food), freedoms (in the labor market, for instance), and capabilities. We can proceed to make social choices based on real variables, and thereby address actual position, and access to advantage. Sen's method of informational broadening allows social choice theory to escape the objections of Robbins, which looked as though they would permanently harm social choice theory.

Additionally, since the seminal results of Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, many positive results focusing on the restriction of the domain of preferences of individuals have elucidated such topics as optimal voting. The initial results emphasized the impossibility of satisfactorily providing a social choice function free of dictatorship and inefficiency in the most general settings. Later results have found natural restrictions that can accommodate many desirable properties.^{[citation needed]}

See also

Notes

References

• 
  Kenneth J. Arrow, 1951, 2nd ed., 1963, Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley. .mw-parser-output cite.citationfont-style:inherit.mw-parser-output qquotes:"""""""'""'".mw-parser-output code.cs1-codecolor:inherit;background:inherit;border:inherit;padding:inherit.mw-parser-output .cs1-lock-free abackground:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/65/Lock-green.svg/9px-Lock-green.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center.mw-parser-output .cs1-lock-limited a,.mw-parser-output .cs1-lock-registration abackground:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d6/Lock-gray-alt-2.svg/9px-Lock-gray-alt-2.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center.mw-parser-output .cs1-lock-subscription abackground:url("//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/aa/Lock-red-alt-2.svg/9px-Lock-red-alt-2.svg.png")no-repeat;background-position:right .1em center.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registrationcolor:#555.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription span,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration spanborder-bottom:1px dotted;cursor:help.mw-parser-output .cs1-hidden-errordisplay:none;font-size:100%.mw-parser-output .cs1-visible-errorfont-size:100%.mw-parser-output .cs1-subscription,.mw-parser-output .cs1-registration,.mw-parser-output .cs1-formatfont-size:95%.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-left,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-leftpadding-left:0.2em.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-right,.mw-parser-output .cs1-kern-wl-rightpadding-right:0.2em
  ISBN 0-300-01364-7
  


• _____, 1972, Link to text of Nobel lecture with Section 8 on the theory and background.


• _____, 1983, Collected Papers, v. 1, Social Choice and Justice
  ISBN 0-674-13760-4
  


• Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura, ed., 1997, Social Choice Re-Examined, 2 vol.
  ISBN 0-312-12739-1 &
  ISBN 0-312-12741-3
  


• _____, ed., 2002, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1. Chapter-preview links.


• _____, ed., 2011, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 2. Chapter-preview links.


• Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark, 2008. "social choice (new developments)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract.
  


• 
  John S. Dryzek and Christian List, 2003. "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, 33(1), pp. 1-28. 2002 PDF link.
  


• Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano, 2006. Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd ed.
  ISBN 0-387-29367-1,
  ISBN 978-0-387-29367-7 Arrow-searchable chapter previews.
  


• 
  Gaertner, Wulf (2006). A primer in social choice theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-929751-1.
  


• 
  John C. Harsanyi, 1987, "interpersonal utility comparisons," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 955–58.


• 
  Moulin, Herve (1988). Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-42458-5.
  


• 
  Nitzan, Shmuel (2010). Collective Preference and Choice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-72213-1.
  


• 
  Lionel Robbins, 1935, 2nd ed.. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, ch. VI


• ____, 1938, "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment," Economic Journal, 43(4), 635–41


• 
  Amartya K. Sen, 1970 [1984], Collective Choice and Social Welfare.
  ISBN 0-444-85127-5 Description.
  


• _____, 1998, "The Possibility of Social Choice," Nobel lecture.


• _____, 1987, "social choice," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 4, pp. 382–93.


• _____, 2008. "social choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract.
  


• 
  Shoham, Yoav; Leyton-Brown, Kevin (2009). Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-89943-7.. A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective; see Chapter 9. Downloadable free online.


• 
  Kotaro Suzumura, 1983, Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare.
  ISBN 0-521-23862-5
  


• 
  Taylor, Alan D. (2005). Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-00883-9.
  


• 
  Myerson, Roger B. (June 2013). "Fundamentals of social choice theory". Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 8 (3): 305–337. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.297.6781. doi:10.1561/100.00013006.
  

External links

• 
  List, Christian. "Social Choice Theory". In Zalta, Edward N. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  


• Social Choice Bibliography by J. S. Kelly